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Overview


On June 20, 2011 the U.S. Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated decision in American Electric Power
v. Connecticut. This is the second climate change case to be decided by that court and the first to concern
common law claims, where the plaintiffs claimed that the greenhouse gases (GHGs) from power plants
constitute a common law nuisance, and asked the court to issue an injunction requiring the plants to reduce
their emissions.



A DBCCA research report of December 2010 indicated that three kinds of outcomes of this case are easily
foreseeable.
 At one end, the Court could rule for the plaintiffs and say these lawsuits are a viable way to fight
climate change; that would no doubt lead to a flood of new suits.
 At the other end, the Court could find that these kinds of disputes do not belong in the courts, and that
the problems of climate change are so diffuse and nonspecific that no one has standing to go to court
to challenge any governmental failure to act.
 A middle position, where the Court could rule that EPA action to regulate GHG emissions has
displaced any need for federal common law remedies, but leaving untouched the rights of
environmental plaintiffs to sue on statutory grounds.



This middle position is in fact what the Supreme Court did. As detailed below, the decision resolves a few
issues but leaves many others open. One line of climate change litigation has been blocked, but many
others remain.



In a nutshell, the Supreme Court cut off the ability of private parties to ask federal judges to set their own
emission standards for GHGs.
 It left the door slightly ajar for plaintiffs to ask judges to set such standards under state law theories,
and conceivably to award money damages, but the decision’s strong language affirming that EPA has
special powers and technical expertise -- and judges do not -- regarding GHGs makes such claims a
very long shot.
 On the other hand, the decision leaves undisturbed, and may strengthen, the ability of states and
maybe citizens and companies to go to court to challenge any EPA failures to follow through on the
dictates of the federal Clean Air Act in regulating GHGs.
 The decision also leaves basically untouched litigation against specific projects, whether they involve
fossil fuels or renewables.
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Background
By way of background, in 2004, at a time when environmentalists were frustrated at the refusal of Congress and
President George W. Bush to regulate GHGs, two suits were brought against six electric power companies that run
fossil fuel plants in a total of 20 states. One suit was brought by eight states and New York City; the other suit was
brought by three land trusts. The plaintiffs in both cases claimed that the GHGs from the power plants constitute a
common law nuisance, and they asked the court to issue an injunction requiring the plants to reduce their emissions.
In 2005, Judge Preska of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the cases on the
grounds that they raise non-justiciable political questions. The Second Circuit heard oral argument in June 2006. As
the third anniversary of that argument passed, the Second Circuit’s long delay in deciding became one of the great
mysteries in climate change law. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court issued the landmark decision in Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency, and later one of the three members of the panel that heard the arguments in the
Connecticut case was elevated to the Supreme Court -- Judge Sotomayor. Finally in September 2009 the two
remaining members of the panel issued the decision -- Judge McLaughlin, an appointee of the first President Bush,
and Judge Hall, appointed by the second President Bush.
The Second Circuit decision was a major win for the plaintiffs. First, the panel found that the case was perfectly
justiciable and did not raise political questions as that concept has been interpreted by the Supreme Court. Second,
though it did not need to, the panel found not only that the States had standing to sue -- which was foretold by the
Massachusetts decision -- but also that the private land trusts had standing because they alleged that their property
was being harmed by climate change. This would potentially open the courthouse doors to broad classes of people
and entities beyond states. Third, the panel found that the federal common law of nuisance applied, and that it had
not been displaced by the Clean Air Act and EPA actions under that statute. Thus the Second Circuit remanded the
case to the district court for further proceedings.

Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. They heard argument in April 19. On June 20 they decided. Eight justices
participated; Justice Sotomayor was recused. The decision was unanimous, 8-0, and was written by Justice
Ginsburg. The decision reversed the Second Circuit and found that the federal common law nuisance claims could
not proceed. The sole reason was that the Clean Air Act, as interpreted in Massachusetts, gave EPA the authority to
regulate greenhouse gases, and EPA was exercising that authority. This displaced the federal common law of
nuisance. The Court declared, “Congress delegated to EPA the decision whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide
emissions from power plants; the delegation is what displaces federal common law.” Thus it is not for the federal
courts to issue their own rules.
This may be the most intriguing paragraph in the opinion: “The petitioners contend that the federal courts lack
authority to adjudicate this case. Four members of the Court would hold that at least some plaintiffs have Article III
standing under Massachusetts, which permitted a State to challenge EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions; and further, that no other threshold obstacle bars review. Four members of the court, adhering to a
dissenting opinion in Massachusetts, or regarding that decision as distinguishable, would hold that none of the
plaintiffs have Article III standing. We therefore affirm, by an equally divided Court, the Second Circuit’s exercise of
jurisdiction and proceed to the merits.”
Though unnamed in the opinion, clearly the four justices who find standing, and no other obstacles to review, are
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan and Kennedy. The four who disagree are Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia,
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Thomas and Alito. The Ginsburg group thus apparently rejects the political question defense as well as the standing
argument. Should another case come up on which Justice Sotomayor was not recused, there might be a 5-4 majority
to allow climate change nuisance litigation, but for the Clean Air Act displacement. So this aspect of the Supreme
Court decision did not set precedent in the technical sense, but it may give an indication of how the Supreme Court as
presently constituted would rule in another case where states sued on public nuisance grounds about GHGs, but
where displacement was not operating.
On the other hand, the paragraph quoted above (when considered in conjunction with Massachusetts) may hint that
Justice Kennedy believes that only states would have standing. Thus there might be a 5-4 majority against any kinds
of GHG nuisance claims (and maybe other kinds of GHG claims) by non-states.

State Claims Left Unresolved
The Court explicitly did not decide whether the Clean Air Act preempts state public nuisance litigation over GHGs.
Thus some plaintiff group will probably press state common law claims, perhaps on the remand in AEP v. Connecticut.
The defendants would certainly argue that the Clean Air Act displaced state common law nuisance claims as well.
The plaintiffs would no doubt counter that the Clean Air Act has provisions that explicitly say that common law claims
are not preempted, at least by certain parts of the Clean Air Act. In the next volley, the defendants would quote
Justice Ginsburg’s statement in AEP that “judges lack the scientific, economic, and technological resources an agency
can utilize in coping with issues of this order … Judges may not commission scientific studies or convene groups of
experts for advice, or issue rules under notice-and-comment procedures.” Where this ball stops, only time can tell.
It is also possible that plaintiffs will forum shop -- they will look for the district or the circuit where they are most likely to
prevail in their non-preemption argument.
Pressing state common law nuisance claims will raise several additional complications. One of them is which state’s
law will apply. If relief is sought against a particular facility, it might well be the law of the state where the facility is
located. The Fourth Circuit recently considered common law nuisance claims against facilities in several states in a
case concerning conventional air pollutants, not GHGs. The court found that the laws of the states where the plants
were located specifically allowed the activities -- in other words, the facilities were operating pursuant to and in
compliance with state permits -- and therefore nuisance actions were precluded. If the same doctrine applied to the
defendants’ facilities in a new case about GHGs, the plaintiffs would face a tough burden in proving that the plants
were not operating in accordance with state law.
Another complication with state common law nuisance claims is that some states would act to bar such claims. On
June 17, 2011, Governor Rick Perry of Texas signed a bill providing that companies sued for nuisance or trespass for
GHG emissions would have an affirmative defense if those companies were in substantial compliance with their
environmental permits.
Since the AEP opinion was based entirely on displacement by Congressional designation of EPA as the decisionmaker on GHG regulation, if Congress takes away EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs but does not explicitly bar federal
common law nuisance claims, these cases will come back. Thus this interestingly changes the political dynamic a bit -success by opponents of GHG regulation in their efforts to take away EPA’s authority could swiftly bring back the
common law claims, unless they are also able to muster enough votes to go further and explicitly preempt the federal
and state common law claims.
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Damages vs. Injunctive Relief
Another question left open is whether the Supreme Court’s decision bars all federal common law nuisance claims, or
only those like AEP that sought injunctive relief. This particular question may be litigated very soon, perhaps in two
different cases -- the two other public nuisance cases for GHGs that are currently pending. One of them is Village of
Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil. That case was dismissed by the district court and is now on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The
case was put on hold pending the decision in AEP. Now that the case is off hold, the plaintiffs are arguing that AEP
affects only suits for injunctive relief, not suits for money damages, like Kivalina. The other case is Comer v. Murphy
Oil, a suit brought by Mississippi landowners saying that Hurricane Katrina was made more intense as a result of
climate change. That suit was dismissed by the district court; reversed by the Fifth Circuit; and then undone through a
bizarre procedural sequence in which the court granted en banc review and vacated the panel decision, and then lost
a quorum for en banc review but left the panel decision vacated. On May 27, 2011, the plaintiffs in Comer re-filed the
case. It, too, is seeking money damages, not an injunction.
The complaints in both Kivalina and Comer also raised the claim that some of the defendant companies have
aggressively misrepresented and concealed scientific information about climate change, and alleged that this
amounted to an actionable civil conspiracy. This clam was not raised in AEP, and it was not decided in either Kivalina
or Comer (or any other U.S. case). Thus it is likely to be raised again.
None of these cases has come close to the merits. There has been no discovery in any of them, or litigation of such
difficult issues as how a district court would determine what is a reasonable level of GHG emissions from a myriad of
industrial facilities, or (in the cases seeking money damages) what defendants would be liable, what plaintiffs would be
entitled to awards, what defendants would have to pay what share of the award, and what plaintiffs would enjoy what
share of the award. Among the other issues that would have to be addressed are extraterritorial jurisdiction over
foreign entities; the impossibility of attributing particular injuries to particular defendants; and the effect of the fact that
most of the relevant emitting facilities were presumably operating in accordance with their governmentally-issued
emissions permits.
Everything else aside, AEP appears to be a reaffirmation of EPA authority. That is shown by two things. First, the
language of the decision itself is quite strong on EPA’s power under the Clean Air Act. For example, the Court stated,
“It is altogether fitting that Congress designated an expert agency, here, EPA, as best suited to serve as primary
regulator of greenhouse gas emissions.” Second, Justices Alito and Thomas wrote a concurring decision saying the
opinion assumed that Massachusetts governed and could not be distinguished; they did not necessarily agree with it,
but no party had raised that issue. But, perhaps significantly, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia did not join in
that concurrence. Therefore its seems that there may now be a 7 to 2 majority in favor of keeping Massachusetts and
its finding that EPA has strong authority to regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act. This, in turn, may have somewhat
strengthened EPA’s hand in the multiple litigations now pending in the U..S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit challenging the EPA regulations.
Thus we have a very interesting situation. All four of the district courts that have ruled in common law nuisance cases
-- AEP, Kivalina, Comer, and a case called California v. General Motors -- have dismissed the cases based on political
question grounds, and, in some instances, on standing grounds. But all three of the appellate courts that have ruled in
these cases -- the Second Circuit in AEP, the Fifth Circuit in Comer (until the panel decision was undone on
procedural grounds), and now the Supreme Court in AEP -- have found that political question and standing are not
obstacles.
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Future Climate Litigation
These U.S. cases (plus a series of cases filed in several different states in May 2011 on a public trust theory) were the
only cases brought anywhere in the world using common law theories to seek either injunctive relief or money
damages for greenhouse gas emissions. The victories by plaintiffs in the Second Circuit in AEP and, for a while, in
the Fifth Circuit in Comer, excited pro-plaintiff environmental lawyers around the world, and the Supreme Court was
being watched with keen interest. Now the Supreme Court has ruled, but the decision is rather narrow, and it might
not have much bearing in a common law country that has not enacted a statute like the Clean Air Act that could be
seen as displacing the common law through its allocation of governmental power over GHGs to an administrative
agency. So the reaction in other such countries is yet another question left open by AEP.
Meanwhile, several other kinds of climate litigation are going forward in the U.S. The DBCCA research report of
November 3, 2010, “Growth of U.S. Climate Change Litigation: Trends & Consequences,” included graphics showing
340 climate cases through October 8, 2010. Attached to this report are updated graphics showing 431 cases as of
June 14, 2011. These are the most common kinds of cases:









Challenges to federal regulations -- A total of 119 lawsuits have been filed challenging federal
action to regulate GHGs. The great bulk of these have been filed by industry and by anti-GHG
regulation states, challenging EPA’s regulations under the Clean Air Act. Most of these are pending
before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and will be heard together. The
briefs are now being filed; all will be filed by the end of 2011. Oral arguments will most likely be heard
in the second or third quarter of 2012, with decision several months later. The first of the EPA
regulations took effect on January 2, 2011; the court refused motions to enjoin them, and as a result,
judicial interference with these regulations is likely out of the picture until at least late 2012. (The
threat that Congress will delay or abolish some of these regulations is much more real.)
Challenges to state regulations -- In the absence of new federal legislation, many states are going
forward with GHG regulations of their own (though fewer than before the November 2010 elections,
when several Democratic governors were replaced by Republican governors who were typically
hostile to such regulations). The leader (as is often the case in environmental regulation) is California.
It is establishing its own cap-and-trade program. The program was stalled by litigation brought by
environmental groups that believed minority communities were being unfairly treated, but that
roadblock has been lifted, at least for now. Other litigation challenges to the actions of states, and of
multi-state groups such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, are pending or anticipated.
Coal plant challenges -- A concerted national campaign has challenged virtually every proposed
coal-fired power plant in the United States. It has been extremely successful; the combination of such
litigation, low natural gas prices, and a sluggish economy has virtually halted new starts of such plants.
The environmental community’s attention is now shifting to attempts to shut down existing coal-fired
power plants, and a new round of litigation can be expected. It is likely to raise a wide variety of
issues -- GHG emissions; conventional air pollutants; discharges of heated cooling water into rivers
and lakes; disposal of coal ash; the environmental impacts of surface coal mines; utility rates; and
anything else the plants’ opponents can devise.
Environmental impact reviews -- The National Environmental Policy Act and its equivalents in about
twenty states require the preparation of environmental impact statements (EISs) for many kinds of
actions. The law has developed that GHG emissions must be disclosed in the EISs for many kinds of
projects. The adequacy of these disclosures are a fertile ground for litigation challenging projects that
are disliked by neighbors or environmental groups.
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Exhibit 1: Types of Climate Cases Filed (431 total cases as of June 14, 2011)
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Exhibit 2: Climate Litigation -- Filings
170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Other

12

Common Law

14

NEPA

19

Coal
Industry
Environmentalist

1
3
10

1

1

1

2

1

1

2
1

1989

1992

1993

1996

1997

2001

2002

1

2003

Year Filed
Source: Arnold & Porter LLP

6 The 2011 Inflection Point for Energy Markets

2
22
2

21
1 4
4

3
10
23
7

2004

2005

2006

2
1
14

9

112

22

22

32

3
12

4
9

9
4

6

6
12
2
6
12
1

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

15

Disclaimer
DB Climate Change Advisors is the brand name for the institutional climate change investment division of Deutsche Asset Management, the asset
management arm of Deutsche Bank AG. In the US, Deutsche Asset Management relates to the asset management activities of Deutsche Bank Trust
Company Americas, Deutsche Investment Management Americas Inc. and DWS Trust Company; in Canada, Deutsche Asset Management Canada
Limited (Deutsche Asset Management Canada Limited is a wholly owned subsidiary of Deutsche Investment Management Americas Inc); in Germany
and Luxembourg: DWS Investment GmbH, DWS Investment S.A., DWS Finanz-Service GmbH, Deutsche Asset Management Investmentgesellschaft
mbH, and Deutsche Asset Management International GmbH; in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, Deutsche Asset Management
International GmbH; in Australia, Deutsche Asset Management (Australia) Limited (ABN 63 116 232 154); in Hong Kong, Deutsche Asset
Management (Hong Kong) Limited; in Japan, Deutsche Asset Management Limited (Japan); in Singapore, Deutsche Asset Management (Asia)
Limited (Company Reg. No. 198701485N) and in the United Kingdom, Deutsche Alternative Asset Management (UK) Limited (formerly known as
RREEF Limited), Deutsche Alternative Asset Management (Global) Limited (formerly known as RREEF Global Advisers Limited), and Deutsche Asset
Management (UK) Limited; in addition to other regional entities in the Deutsche Bank Group.
This material is intended for informational purposes only and it is not intended that it be relied on to make any investment decision. It does not
constitute investment advice or a recommendation or an offer or solicitation and is not the basis for any contract to purchase or sell any security or
other instrument, or for Deutsche Bank AG and its affiliates to enter into or arrange any type of transaction as a consequence of any information
contained herein. Neither Deutsche Bank AG nor any of its affiliates, gives any warranty as to the accuracy, reliability or completeness of information
which is contained in this document. Except insofar as liability under any statute cannot be excluded, no member of the Deutsche Bank Group, the
Issuer or any officer, employee or associate of them accepts any liability (whether arising in contract, in tort or negligence or otherwise) for any error
or omission in this document or for any resulting loss or damage whether direct, indirect, consequential or otherwise suffered by the recipient of this
document or any other person.
The views expressed in this document constitute Deutsche Bank AG or its affiliates’ judgment at the time of issue and are subject to change. This
document is only for professional investors. This document was prepared without regard to the specific objectives, financial situation or needs of any
particular person who may receive it. The value of shares/units and their derived income may fall as well as rise. Past performance or any prediction
or forecast is not indicative of future results. No further distribution is allowed without prior written consent of the Issuer.
The forecasts provided are based upon our opinion of the market as at this date and are subject to change, dependent on future changes in the
market. Any prediction, projection or forecast on the economy, stock market, bond market or the economic trends of the markets is not necessarily
indicative of the future or likely performance.
For Investors in the United Kingdom
Issued in the United Kingdom by Deutsche Asset Management (UK) Limited of One Appold Street, London, EC2A 2UU. Authorised and regulated by
the Financial Services Authority. This document is a "non-retail communication" within the meaning of the FSA’s Rules and is directed only at persons
satisfying the FSA’s client categorisation criteria for an eligible counterparty or a professional client. This document is not intended for and should not
be relied upon by a retail client.
When making an investment decision, potential investors should rely solely on the final documentation relating to the investment or service and not
the information contained herein. The investments or services mentioned herein may not be appropriate for all investors and before entering into any
transaction you should take steps to ensure that you fully understand the transaction and have made an independent assessment of the
appropriateness of the transaction in the light of your own objectives and circumstances, including the possible risks and benefits of entering into such
transaction. You should also consider seeking advice from your own advisers in making this assessment. If you decide to enter into a transaction with
us you do so in reliance on your own judgment.
For Investors in Australia
In Australia, Issued by Deutsche Asset Management (Australia) Limited (ABN 63 116 232 154), holder of an Australian Financial Services License.
This information is only available to persons who are professional, sophisticated, or wholesale investors under the Corporations Act. An investment
with Deutsche Asset Management is not a deposit with or any other type of liability of Deutsche Bank AG ARBN 064 165 162, Deutsche Asset
Management (Australia) Limited or any other member of the Deutsche Bank AG Group. The capital value of and performance of an investment with
Deutsche Asset Management is not guaranteed by Deutsche Bank AG, Deutsche Asset Management (Australia) Limited or any other member of the
Deutsche Bank Group. Deutsche Asset Management (Australia) Limited is not an Authorised Deposit taking institution under the Banking Act 1959
nor regulated by the Australian Prudential Authority. Investments are subject to investment risk, including possible delays in repayment and loss of
income and principal invested.
For Investors in Hong Kong
Interests in the funds may not be offered or sold in Hong Kong or other jurisdictions, by means of an advertisement, invitation or any other document,
other than to Professional Investors or in circumstances that do not constitute an offering to the public. This document is therefore for the use of
Professional Investors only and as such, is not approved under the Securities and Futures Ordinance (SFO) or the Companies Ordinance and shall
not be distributed to non-Professional Investors in Hong Kong or to anyone in any other jurisdiction in which such distribution is not authorised. For the
purposes of this statement, a Professional investor is defined under the SFO.
For Investors in MENA region
This information has been provided to you by Deutsche Bank AG Dubai (DIFC) branch, an Authorised Firm regulated by the Dubai Financial Services
Authority. It is solely directed at Market Counterparties or Professional Clients of Deutsche Bank AG Dubai (DIFC) branch, which meets the regulatory
criteria as established by the Dubai Financial Services Authority and may not be delivered to or acted upon by any other person.
I-023207-2.5

7

